Adaptations of the News Media and Social Media Logics by Indonesian Political Parties’ Leaders and Presidential Candidates after 2004 Indonesian Presidential Election

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Abstract
Adaptations of political actors and organizations in Asian democratic countries to the media and social media logics have been increasingly visible. This article is specified to answer the following questions of how Indonesian political parties’ leaders and presidential candidates after 2004 Indonesian presidential election adapted to the news and social media logics and what drove such adaptations. Focusing on such questions, this article adopts theoretical models of mediatisation of politics formulated by Mazzoleni and Schulz, Strömbäck and Stromback and Van Aelts and extracts in-depth interview data derived from six Indonesian political parties’ leaders, two political consultants and six senior journalists associated with Indonesian media using the qualitative content and thematic analyses. The findings are as follows. These political parties’ leaders and presidential candidates favoured adapting to the news and social media logics when they got to deal with political issues and affairs, formulate political policies and secure their personal images in Indonesian political sphere. Such development was driven by the following factors, including establishing democratic political and media systems, increasing the roles of the media as sources of political information, escalating freedoms of Indonesian media and journalists to manage the media logic. Theoretical implications are chronicled and research recommendations are displayed.

Keywords: democratic media system; Indonesia’s democracy; news media logic; presidential candidate; social media logic; post-Indonesia’s 2004 presidential election

Introduction
Within the last couple of decades, mediatisation has been widely adopted as a research perspective to capture and explore the increasing roles and powers of the media and their consequences on society, cultures and politics (Krotz, 2007: 257; Krotz, 2009: 25; Hepp, 2011: 11-12; Krotz, 2014). This perspective has been deployed to evaluate the ways the media and their logics constantly (re) shape and influence society, culture and politics (Couldry and Hepp, 2013; Esser, 2013; Hjarvard, 2013, 2014; Strömbäck and Esser, 2009). However, while disputable debates regarding ontological and epistemological dimensions that constitute mediatisation remained prevail (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014, 2015; Hepp et al., 2015; Wojtkowski, 2017), we
lacked a knowledge of what have driven the development of mediatisation of politics in the Asian democracies.

Having adopted the institutionalist mediatisation perspective, some authors examined the ways and the degree to which political actors (such as members of parliament, political pundits and journalists) perceive the media’s political influence (Strömbäck, 2011a), interact with and address the mass media (Elmelund-Praestekær et al., 2011, Aalberg and Strömbäck, 2011), manage their roles in political affairs and their visibilities in the news, more specifically, in facing the election campaigning (Hopmann and Strömbäck, 2010). Subsequent authors also explored diverse factors that encouraged such political actors to adopt the (news) media logic (Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013; Landerer, 2013; Asp, 2014, Meyen et al., 2014; Pallas et al., 2016) and managed such adaptation when they dealt with diverse types of the mainstream media (Casero-Ripollès et al., 2016; Blach-Orsten et al., 2017). However, while it has been argued that mediatisation of politics that evolved in the emerging democracies are likely dissimilar from its counterpart in the Western-established democracies (Voltmer and Sorensen, 2016: 1), a knowledge of developments in the mediatisation of politics that took place after 2004 Indonesian presidential election and also the structural factors and conditions that determined such developments has been under-developed.

This article argues that a specific research focusing on such issues is really important. The reasons are as follows. First, since the downfall of the Soeharto regime, not merely the Indonesian people, but also Indonesian political parties and these parties’ politicians have been increasingly dependent on the media, especially the Indonesian news TV channels (Lim, 2011, 2013; Nugroho and Syarief 2012; Ahmad, 2017, 2020). However, while behavioural orientations of these political parties and politicians associated with these parties in Indonesian political sphere have been increasingly determined by the media and the media-related actors (Ahmad, 2019, 2022), the structural factors that stimulate Indonesian political parties’ leaders and these parties’ presidential candidates to adopt the media logic have, however, been under-researched.

Secondly, the existing literature indicates that since the roles of the media in shaping politics and political affairs have been increasing, political actors and organisations have been interested in adopting the (news) media logic (Stromback, 2008, 2011a, 2011b; Strömback and Esser, 2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). In consideration of such development, Strömback (2008) and Strömback and Aelst (2013) proposed theoretical models to evaluate the media logic adaptation by political party. While these models remain hypothetical, none of them gave us a knowledge of what structural factors drove leaders of Indonesian political parties in the Post-Soeharto regime and these parties’ presidential candidates to adopt the news media logic.

Based on such background, this article raises the following questions of how Indonesian political parties’ leaders and presidential candidates after 2004 Indonesian presidential election adopted the news and social media logics and what drove such adaptation. This article evaluates these questions through the following sections. The first and second sections, respectively, discuss mediatisation of politics as a research perspective and clarify adaptation to the media logic by political actors as a dimension that constitute mediatisation of politics. The third section delineates the research propositions, method and materials. The fourth and fifth sections chronicle the research findings, while the sixth section discusses the findings. The last section outlines the conclusion and research recommendations. Such points are detailed as follows.

Theoretical Framework

Within the last couple of decades, mediatisation has been understood using diverse perspectives. For example, ‘mediatisation’ has been seen as ‘problematic concomitants or consequences of the development of modern mass media’ (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 249). It is defined as ‘the transformation of many disparate social and cultural processes into forms or formats suitable for media re-presentation’ and ‘common patterns across disparate areas’ (Couldry, 2008: 377). It is also considered as being closely related with ‘the processes of social change’ wherein ‘the media play a key role as extension, substitution, amalgamation and accommodation’ of those who have been taking part in such processes (Schulz, 2004: 88). It is also understood as ‘meta process by
which everyday practices and social relations are increasingly shaped by mediating technology and media organizations’ (Livingstone, 2009a: 3; Livingstone, 2009b: x). It is also conceptualized as ‘a more long-lasting process, whereby social and cultural institutions and modes of interaction are changed as a consequence of the growth of the media’s influence’ (Hjarvard, 2008: 114).

The above-mentioned arguments indicate that mediatisation is actually a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. In consideration of this, Hepp (2013), Coudry and Hepp (2013) and Hepp and Krotz (2014) advocated using the institutionalist and social-constructivist research approaches. These approaches so far, have been seen as being helpful to capture and understand diverse dimensions that constitute mediatisation of society, cultures and politics (Block, 2013, Knoplauch, 2013; Jensen, 2013; Hepp et al., 2015; Lunt and Livingstone, 2016). The existing literatures advanced by those who followed such approaches however, entail the following weaknesses. At first, such literatures overemphasized the roles of the media as agents of changes (Deacon and Stanyer, 2014: 1034-1035). Secondly, such literatures also clarified less the ways the non-media actors considered the media logic, on the one hand, and the media and communication environment, on the other (Deacon and Stanyer, 2014: 1035-1036).

In addressing such issues, Hepp et al. (2015: 316) suggested that research on mediatisation should consider the ways and the degree to which the logic of the media have an impact on the logics of other institutions, such as religion or politics. Similarly, Krotz (2017) highlighted the need to understand mediatisation using the non-media centric perspective to ‘reconstruct what has happened in the perspective of the communicating individuals and other social actors’ (Krotz, 2017: 106).

These authors overall, highlighted the need to evaluate adaptation of the media logic by the non-media actors using either the institutionalist or the social-constructivist research approaches (Hepp, 2013, Coudry and Hepp, 2013, Hepp and Krotz, 2014). They however, lacked offering a systematic conceptual lens to evaluate the structural factors and conditions that determine the ways the non-media actors adopted such logic. Adopting the institutional non-media actor as a research approach, this article adopts the ideas of Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) and Strömbäck (2008) and Stromback and Aelst (2013) regarding mediatisation of politics—in general—and adaptation of the media logic by political actors—in particular. This point is chronicled as follows.

**Political Actors and Adaptation of the (News) Media Logic**

Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 250) defined mediatisation of politics as ‘politics that has lost its autonomy (and) has become dependent in its central functions on mass media and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media’ (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 250). It likely evolves as and the ‘media logic’ has been much more prevalent in the political sphere. Such logic refers to ‘the frame of reference within which the media construct the meaning of events and personalities they report’ and ‘patterns of the media formats’ (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 250-251).

Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) proposed that the following conditions and factors likely drive such developments. These conditions include the crisis of the party system and changes in the relationships between the media and political institutions (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 252-257). These factors consist of transformations of style of the news reporting and definition of news worthiness and increasing functional powers of the media in formulating their agenda and political agenda setting (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 250-251), increasingly need for political actors and institutions to adopt the media logic and raising domination of such logic over the political logic (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999: 251-252).

Taking the ideas of Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999), Strömbäck (2008, 2011a, 2011b) and his colleagues (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) argued that adaptation of the media logic in political spheres paves the way for not only politics being mediatized, but also the emergence of mediatisation of politics. As compared to Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999), they offered a much more established theoretical model to understand dimensions that constitute mediatisation of politics. This theoretical model can be classified as a general theory. It is a type of theory that ‘integrates and explains processes of mediatisation across time...
and sociocultural contexts’ (Ekström et al., 2016: 1095). This model incorporates the ‘concepts at lower levels of abstractions’, which are media logic, political logic, mediated politics and mediatized politics (Strömbäck, 2008: 233-234, Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011: 33; Strömbäck and Esser, 2009: 213-214). Since this model includes such concepts, it quite meets with Deacon and Stanyer’ (2014: 1040) suggestion. Such concepts are specified to holistically capture and explore dimensions that construct mediatisation of politics. Such dimensions include the ways and the degrees to which the media had prominent roles and powers as the most important source of information and channel of communication (a), the media gain their own autonomy and self-rule when they dealt with the other social and political institutions (b), the contents of media are determined by either the “media logic” or “political logic” (c) and political actors and political organizations are directed by either the “media logic” or “political logic” (Strömbäck, 2008: 238-241; Strömbäck, 2011a: 425; Strömbäck and Esser, 2009: 213-216; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011: 31; Strömbäck and Esser, 2014a: 6-8; Strömbäck and Esser, 2014b: 244; Strömbäck and Esser, 2014c: 246).

Mazzoneli and Schultz’s (1999) model focuses on the structural conditions and factors that lead mediatisation of politics to taking place. This model however lacks offering a comprehensive explanation regarding dimensions that constitute such development. Stromback’s (2008) model instead, gives us invaluable conceptual framework to capture and explore such dimensions holistically. As compared to Mazzoneli and Schultz’s (1999) model, Strömbäck’s (2008) model has been seen as being much more helpful to explore the dynamics that inform the ways political actors and organisations, especially, political parties and these parties’ MPs and candidates adopted the media logic (Aalberg and Strömbäck, 2011; Elmelund-Præstekær, 2011; Skogherbo and Karsen, 2014; Meyen et al., 2014). This model has been seen as being workable to examine the ways the media-related actors considered such logic in the political spheres (Keppinger, 2002; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011; Takens et al., 2013; Cushion et al., 2014, Cushion et al., 2015). This model has been also seen as being useful to examine the roles and powers of the media and their impacts on not merely perceptions formulated by journalists’ regarding the media influence (Strömbäck, 2011a), but also actions made by political decision makers (Reunanen et al., 2010; Kunelius and Reunanen, 2012). This model however, lacks a systematic explanation of the structural factors that stimulate political parties and these parties’ leaders and politicians to adopt such logic.

In regard to this issue, Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013) formulated a model of the media adaptation by political party and also visualized diverse factors that determine this adaptation. In this model, political party’ leader is seen as a strategic actor that determines what they called party’s organizational adaptation (Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013: 344) and party’s communication adaptation (Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013: 344-345). Party’s organizational adaptation is likely to evolve when the party hires ‘specialized personnel to manage and respond to the mass media’, establish ‘press offices’, increase ‘the resources allocated for media management, including the senior press officer or communication manager in the top of the party decision-making structure’ (Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013: 344). Party’s communication adaptation is likely to emerge when the party proactively shapes the media agenda and promotes their issues and framing through the media (Stromback and Van Aelst, 2013: 344), develops ‘their communication to the media’, establishes ‘information subsidies’, builds close personal relationships with journalists’ in either formal or informal settings and feeds them ‘with exclusive information’ either (Stromback and Van Aelst, 2013: 344-345).

This article argues that such adaptations may take place within either the election or non-election contexts. Such adaptations are likely to be determined by strategic goals considered by the party within and across the following political arenas. These goals include the vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking (Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013: 346). These political arenas consist of the electoral, parliamentary, internal and media arenas (Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013: 347-351).

Material and Methodology

This article is specified to evaluate the following questions: of how Indonesian political parties’ leaders and presidential candidates after 2004 Indonesian presidential
election adapted to the news and social media logics and what drove such adaptation. Focusing on such questions, this article proposes the following propositions. At first, after 2004 Indonesian presidential election, Indonesian political parties’ leaders and presidential candidates nominated by these parties to run for president are likely to adopt the news media logic. Such adaptation is likely to be driven by the following factors. These factors include establishing democratic political and media systems, increasing roles of the media as sources of political information and escalating freedoms of Indonesian media and journalists to formulate the media logic. These factors are likely to encourage these political parties’ leaders and presidential candidates to exploit such logic when they got to deal with political issues and affairs, formulate political policies and manage their personal political images.

To evaluate such propositions, this article adopts the qualitative case study, as proposed by Yin (2014), as a research method. This method is defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context’ (Yin, 2014: 13). The reasons for adopting this method are as follows. This method has long been considered as a workable research strategy to capture and explore either a single case or multiple cases. Those who adopted it are likely being much more capable of collecting and combining diverse types of data derived from archives, reports and observations and extracting such data and evidences to ‘provide description’ and ‘generate a theory’ or concept as well (Yin, 2014: 27).

There have been diverse types of case study methods (Yin, 2014). In regard to this, this article favoured adopting descriptive case study method, as posited by Yin (2014). The reasons for doing so are as follows. This method is specified to help the researchers who focus on ‘what question’ much more rather than ‘who, where, how and why questions’ (Yin, 2014: 5). This method is also widely recognized as a workable method to collect and analyse the data derived from either the contemporary or the non-contemporary events (Yin, 2014: 11-13), which are needed to answer such a ‘what question’. Those who adopted it are likely capable of gathering multiple source of evidence as data and evaluating data using a triangulation procedure to come up with the findings (Yin, 2014: 13).

Having adopted this method, this article organizes the following efforts. At first, the in-depth interview data were derived from 6 Indonesian political parties’ leaders, 2 political consultants and 6 senior journalists associated with Indonesian media. These political parties’ leaders, political consultants and journalists are, respectively, coded as IJ1-IJ6, IPC1 and IPC2, and IPP1-IPP6. These political parties’ leaders, political consultants and journalists were selected as key respondents due to the following reasons. The first has been widely acknowledged as strategic actors in Indonesian politics. The second has been recognized as professionals who have been hired by the first. The third have been working for the Indonesian mainstream within the last two decades and familiar with the behaviours of the first and the second in Indonesian political sphere.

Secondly, the following procedures were carried out to evaluate such propositions. Such in-depth interview data, reports and regulations were extracted and analysed using the qualitative-thematic context analyses posited by Butler-Kisber (2010). Such analyses were carried out through the following procedures. These include familiarising with data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes and producing the reports. Such efforts were taken to generate the following findings.

**Result and Discussion**

Indonesia is one of Asian democratic countries, which follows the presidential government system (Ahmad, 2017). In between 1966-1998, Indonesia has been ruled under Soeharto authoritarian regime. During the first and second decades of this regime ruling this country, the media and journalism, as social institutions, have been de-politicized forcefully, but as economic institutions, they have been thriving significantly (Dhakidae, 1991). This trend continued to prevail within the last decade when this regime was in power (Hidayat and Sendjaja, 2002).

Soon after this regime collapsed in May 1998, democratisation of politics took shape in this country and a democratic election system to vote members of Indonesian House of Representative/Parliament was being established either (Bunten and Uffen, 2010). These lead the following developments to
taking place. *At first*, MPs elected in the 1999 general election gradually amended the National Constitution of 1945. According to Article 6A of the amended version of this constitution, a political party or a coalition of political parties that obtained seats in the Indonesian Parliament could nominate a pair of presidential and vice presidential candidates that should be elected by the Indonesian people directly.

*Secondly*, as ordained by Articles No.5 (1), No. 20 (points 1, 2 and 4), No.21 (point 1), No.27, No.28 F, No.31 (point 1), No.32, No.33 (point 3) and No.36 of this constitution, these MPs proposed the new Press Bill which was later passed into Law No.40/1999. They also redrafted the existing Broadcasting Law and stipulated it as Law No.32/2002. These lead to the relationships between the media organizations, states, markets and civil societies turning into much more democratic models (Gazali, 2004; Gazali et al., 2009) and the degrees of autonomy and self-rule of the Indonesian media outlets have been rocketing significantly (Hidayat and Sendjaja, 2002; Gazali, 2004; Gazali et al., 2009). These also allow the media to enjoy the press freedom and democratic political environments (Hidayat and Sendjaja, 2002; Gazali, 2004; Gazali et al., 2009; Nugroho et al., 2012) and commercial business environment (Lim, 2013; Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). As such developments took place, total number of the Indonesian people who accessed and considered the media as primary source of information increased substantially (Lim, 2011, 2013). These encourages Indonesian political parties’ leaders, prominent politicians and public figures, especially those who want to step in Indonesia’s 2004 presidential election to adapt to the (news) media logic. This point is chronicled as follows.

**The (News) Media Logic Adaptation after Indonesia’s 2004 Directly Elected Presidency**

Since democratic political and media systems were established, the subsequent transformations took place in this country. *At first*, the ways the media managed its logic and addressed the non-media actors changed substantially. In addressing such issues, IJ-1 described such trends as follows.

“After Indonesia’s 2004 directly elected presidency era, the commercial and political interests of these media have been much more prevalent. There have been rooms for spin-doctors, media strategies and political consultants in Indonesian politics. They determined the most important political issue that have been released and mediated by these media. They influenced the ways political parties and their leaders in this country dealt with this issue, on the one hand, and people thought about this issue, on the other (IJ-1, personal interview, 21 September 2013).

*Secondly*, as the ‘media logic’ became much more prevalent, most of the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders and politicians favoured hiring the (former) senior editors/journalists and deployed them as spin-doctors and media strategists in order to deal with this logic and accommodate it strategically (personal interviews with IJ-2, 22 September 2013 and IPC-1, 24 October 2014). Nonetheless, they were asked to share their knowledge and experiences regarding the ways the media operated this logic while covering political issues and constructing political discourses. In addressing this issue, IJ-3 provided the following testimony.

“Some of Indonesian political parties’ leaders and politicians asked me and my fellows to share our knowledge and experiences regarding operationalization of the news media logic when the media reported political issues and constructed political discourses. They were eager to develop the better ways to deal with such political issues and discourses strategically” (IJ-3, personal interview, 31 October 2014).

Since 2004s, there has been an increasing number of Indonesian political parties’ leaders and politicians who preferred asking editors/journalist to share special communication skills to help when they want to handle some influential media and manage political agenda and discourses driven by such media that had an impact on their performances in the parliament or the government (personal interviews with IJ-4, 10 September 2013, IJ-5, 5 November 2014 and IJ-6, 15 September 2013). Some of these political parties’ leaders and politicians made this effort when they run for members of parliament and president as well in Indonesia in 2009. In addressing this issue, IPP-1 stated as follows.
"The success of the party in handling political affairs really depends on the capabilities of its leaders and politicians in dealing with the media. We realized that most of the issues we got to deal with during the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections have been strongly driven by political discourses framed by the media. Even, in some cases, we felt that we have been really undermined by the media (IPP-1, personal interview, 5 November 2014).

Soon after these elections were held, they strived to improve their capabilities in managing the (news) media logic and responding to the media-related actors. In addressing such issues, IPP-2 voiced as follows.

"We really noticed that having a professional capability to handle the media and the ways the journalists framed and broadcast political news and discourses is very important to secure the image of our party. Such efforts were strategically made, especially when this party and its leader got to manage the parliament and rule the government (IPP-2, personal interview, 13 May 2014).

Those who had sufficient financial resources favoured hiring political consultants and media strategists personally much more. Such efforts are specified to secure their personal political images, gain supports from the electorates, the media, the social media users and campaign-donors, develop workable media management and media relation strategies and improve political communication skills of these parties’ MPs candidates who run for the 2014 parliamentary election (personal interviews with IPP-3, 25 July, 2014, IPP-4, 13 May 2014, and IPP-5, 14 May 2014). They managed to do so to make them capable of managing negative political issues and discourses driven by the media (personal Interviews with IPP-6, 22 May 2014 and IPP-5, 14 May 2014).

Overall, Indonesian political parties with plenty of campaign resources, parliamentary seats and influential public figures or led by those who were eager to nominate or to be nominated as (the running mate of) presidential candidate(s) to contest Indonesian presidential race in 2014 made such efforts much more (personal interviews with IJ-5, 6 November 2014 and IJ-3, 20 October 2014). But, only a few of these parties’ leaders and public figures successfully emerged as influential figures in 2004, 2009 and 2014 presidential elections in Indonesia. Two of them are Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Joko Widodo (Jokowi). This point is briefly chronicled as follows.

General (ret) SBY is a founder of Democratic Party. He was nominated by a coalition of small-sized parties, which are Democratic Party, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and United Development Party (PPP), to run for president in 2004. He won this presidential election surprisingly. His personal and organisational capabilities to handle the (news) media logic and the ways the media operated this logic in the political sphere led to his personal image in the media and the electorates’ supports to him in between the presidential elections in 2004 and 2009 escalating substantially (personal interviews with IPC-1, 24 October 2014 and IJ-2, 21 September 2013). While his party emerged as a winner in Indonesia’s 2009 parliamentary election, he got elected in Indonesia’s 2009 presidential election. He has been widely recognized as a prominent Indonesian politician who cautiously addressed the news media logic, strategically dealt with the operationalization of this logic and successfully transformed himself to be what Mazzoleni (2008: 2932) dubbed as ‘media savvy’ and ‘media-genic’ (personal interviews with IJ-5, 6 November 2014, IJ-3, 20 October 2014 and IPC-2, 17 November 2014).

Similarly, Jokowi, a former mayor of Surakarta City, Central Java Province has been widely seen as having personal and organisational communication skills to handle not only modes of the media-related actors operationalized the ‘news media logic’, but also the ways the social media users harnessed the ‘social media logic’ in political spheres (personal interviews with IJ-5, 6 November 2014 and IJ-3, 20 October 2014). Since he had an influential and attractive personality, leadership and political communication style and was endorsed by a substantial number of media-related actors and social media users either (Ahmad, 2014), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) and Greater Indonesia Movement (Gerinda) Party nominated him to run for Jakarta governor in 2012 (personal interviews with IJ-5, 6 November 2014, and IJ-3, 20 October 2014).

As he won the gubernatorial election, he constantly emerged as an influential politician. In consideration of such development, PDIP
which coalesced with National Democrat (Nasdem) Party, Nation Awakening Party (PKB), People’s Conscience (Hanura) Party and Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) finally nominated him as a presidential candidate in 2014. Thanks to his success in managing both the (news) media and social media logics and fulfilling the expectations of the media and the social media-related actors, he got substantial endorsements not only from such actors, but also from the electorates they targeted. These led to him winning this election (personal interview with IPC-2, 17 November 2014).

Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 252-257) voiced that crisis of the party system and changes in the relationships between the media and political institutions allowed mediatisation of politics to take shape in democratic countries. However, while these authors merely focused on what has driven mediatisation of politics in the Western democracy, they lacked explanation of the structural factors that propelled development of mediatisation of politics in the emerging democracies. The findings reported by this article revealed that within the specific context of Indonesia’s democracy, especially after 2004 Indonesian presidential election, it was not such crisis of the party system and changes that propelled such development. Instead, it is the following factors that have driven such development. These factors include democratisation of politics and establishment of democratic political and media systems and increasing functional powers of the Indonesian mainstream media in formulating their agenda and political agenda setting.

Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013) argued that political party’ leader is likely to take place as an influential actor that determines both party’s organizational adaptation and party’s communication adaptation while dealing with increasing powers of the media and the media logic (Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013: 344-345). The findings indicated that after Indonesia’s 2004 directly elected presidency era, not only the party’ leader, but also the party’s presidential candidate evolved as an influential actor. However, instead of encouraging the party to adopt the (news) media logic, the party’ presidential candidate and his campaign team favoured exploiting this logic to manage the public issues and secure his personal image in political sphere. Such evidence substantiates the ideas of Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013).

The findings also revealed that SBY and Jokowi, as a presidential candidate who ran in Indonesia’s 2009 and 2014 presidential elections respectively, favoured adopting the ‘news media logic’ and ‘social media logic’ respectively. They did so when they dealt with political issues evolving in the media and electoral arenas and attempted to get substantial endorsements from the media and the social media-related actors and the electorates they targeted. Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) clarified less the news media and social media logics. Strömbäck (2008), Strömbäck (2011a, 2011b) and Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011: 35) instead, detailed the components that form the first, but did not clarify the second. These hint the need for us to adopt the ideas of Van Dijck and Poell (2013: 3), Kalsnes (2016), Kalness et al. (2017) and refine a model of the media adaptation by political party posited by Stromback and Van Aelts (2013) as we want to systematically explore diverse factors that drive adaptations of such logics by political parties’ leaders and politicians in the emerging democracies, especially those who share similarities with the Indonesian politics.

The findings indicated that within the specific context of Indonesia’s democracy, not merely Indonesian political parties’ leaders, but also presidential candidate nominated by these political parties took place as a strategic actor that determines transformation of mediatisation of politics in this country. Most of these political parties’ leaders realized the need to adopt the (news) media logic. None of them however, favoured developing what Stromback and Van Aelts (2013: 344) called as ‘party’ organizational adaptation’. They instead, merely advanced some elements that constitute what Stromback and Van Aelts (2013: 344-345) named as ‘party communication adaptation’. These elements include employing specialized personnel to manage and respond to the mass media and allocating special resources for media management. These substantiate the idea of Stromback and Van Aelts (2013). These also hint the need for us to advance a specific model that explains the news media and social media adaptations by political party’ politicians who nominate for either MPs or president respectively in the parliamentary and presidential elections and the structural factors that influence such adaptations as well.
Conclusions
This article is directed towards exploring adaptations of the news and social media logics by Indonesian political parties’ leaders and presidential candidates after 2004 Indonesian presidential election and the structural factors and conditions that drive such adaptation. The findings exhibited that these parties’ leaders and presidential candidates favoured adapting to the news and social media logics when they got to deal with political issues and affairs, formulate political policies and secure their personal images in Indonesian political sphere. Such adaptation was driven by the following factors, which are establishing democratic political and media systems, increasing the roles of the media as sources of political information, escalating freedoms of Indonesian media and journalists to manage the media logic. The findings also revealed that the Indonesian political parties’ presidential candidates took place as an influential actor that propels development of mediatisation of politics after Indonesia’s 2004 directly elected presidency era.

As reflected by these findings, this article concludes the following points. Mediatisation of politics can be deployed as a research perspective to understand adaptation of the (news) media and social media logics by political party’ leaders and prominent political actor/figure in Indonesia’s democracy. Theoretical models of mediatisation of politics posed by Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) and Strömbäck (2008, 2011a, 2011b) and his colleagues (Strömbäck and Esser, 2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011; Strömbäck and Van Aelst, 2013) appear to be workable as we want to explore the (news) media and social media logics adaptations carried out by prominent political actors in the emerging democratic countries that share similar characteristics with Indonesian politics. Further researches need to be conducted to evaluate the ways such adaptations took shape in these countries. We need to refine these models, as we want to do so however. We also need to consider the election and the non-election contexts wherein such adaptations take shape and realize variability of the political, election and media systems that exist in such countries as well. We also need to consider the party organizational factors and individual factors associated with the party’ politicians; whether they ran for the elections or already ruled the government/parliament.

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