

## Communication of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia in Handling Radicalism

<http://dx.doi.org/10.25008/jkiski>

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**Submitted:** May 24, 2024; **Revised:** May 7, 2025; **Accepted:** June 1, 2025

Accredited by Kemdikbudristek: No. 152/E/KPT/2023

**Abstract** - Radicalization can lead to acts of terrorism so the government has to combat it. This study aims to investigate the communication of the National Police in suppressing radicalism in the Poso District. This study used qualitative methods and the data were collected by in-depth interviews. The population of this study was terrorist convicts, former terrorist convicts, families of terrorists and ex-terrorists, and all parties involved in handling radicalism in Poso District determined using the purposive sampling technique. Then, the data were analyzed by process coding, descriptive coding, and value coding. Further, the radicalism in this district was caused by revenge and injustice which made people easily “*Polisi Madago Raya*” comes from the Pamona language which means good-hearted police. The program focuses on 3 aspects of deradicalization (strengthening the role of local police personnel in deradicalization activities; mapping areas of radicalism; building synergy in handling radicalism with stakeholders; and optimizing the role of religious leaders, community leaders and traditional leaders); counter deradicalization (determining the classification of *kelurahan*, village, or hamlet with characteristics of the threat of radicalism; listing the number of victims of radicalism; and carrying out police operations); rehabilitation (treatment of ex-terrorist convicts, families of terrorist convicts, families of the wanted list (*Daftar Pencarian Orang*, DPO) who died as a result of police law enforcement). Get recruited by Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) to carry out acts of radicalism that led to terrorism. The National Police has used social media such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to suppress the growth and development of radicalism.

**Keywords:** Communication; Conflict; Radicalism; Social Media; Terrorist.

### Introduction

In the study of terrorism, Muslims based on methods religion can be divided into three groups, fundamental Islam, moderate Islam, and liberal Islam (Faqihuddin, 2021; Firmansyah et al., 2023; Parhan et al., 2022). Liberal and moderate Islam have something in common, namely as an Islamic group that understand religious texts thoroughly contextual, and well linked with local culture, science, and technology. Both groups are capable adapt to change, even especially in liberal Islamic

groups as there are certain opinions in religious matters which contradicts the text revelation for the sake of accommodating change. These two groups difficult to change into radicalism, let alone terrorism (Khoiriyah, 2024; Lindgren et al., 2022; Van Es, 2021).

Historically, radicalism has existed in Indonesia for a long time and it is growing rapidly especially related to religion (Asrori, 2015; Prasetyawati, 2017; Schmidt, 2021). The radicalism phenomenon is characterized by the number of bombs detonating and killings of religious backgrounds in many areas. Even, it is difficult to distinguish between acts of radicalism and terrorism today. Currently, acts of terrorism are often associated with Islam, while other religions consider radicalism as a curse (Al Qurtuby, 2022; Ireka, 2024; Zulfahri & Auliya, 2023).

Islamic radical movements in Indonesia are only limited to demands for the fulfilment of Islamic aspirations, such as the implementation of Islamic law or the Jakarta Charter (Azra, 2000; Shalihah, 2022; Hsb, 2021). Radicalism in Indonesia, especially in Poso District, Central Sulawesi Province, originates from a religious background and violent conflict. The act of radicalism still exists and it is considered an act of terrorism. The orientation of radicalism is terrorism (Prasetyawati, 2017; Zuhri, 2018). The acts of terrorism that often occur in this district have made the National Police through the Poso Police Precinct design various programs to suppress such acts. One of the programs that have been implemented to present is the “*Polisi Madago Raya*”. The government, through the National Police and the Indonesian Military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI), has made some efforts to suppress radicalism and terrorism in some regions.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Some previous studies have examined terrorism and radicalism. Nurdin (2017) conducted a study in East Java and he found that the role of the Indonesian Military and National Police in dealing with terrorists is still very minimal (Nurdin, 2017). Meanwhile, the Java-centric handling was suspected of causing the spread of terror groups to other regions (Hutagalung, 2019).

Hutagalung (2019) suggested efforts against terrorism such as strengthening surveillance and prevention based on mapping and threat assessment that has been carried out and continue to be updated; as well as strengthening the community-based approach. The government implements that effort through various programs of the National Police.

Specifically, in Poso District, the police are running the “*Polisi Madago Raya*” program to suppress radicalism and terrorism. It aims to make the area safe from conflict and free from the influence of radical groups. In the implementation, it prioritizes the functions of the Police's Community Development (*Pembinaan Masyarakat*, Binmas) unit and Intelligence unit. The Binmas unit often interacts and communicates with the public and ex-terrorist convicts and knows more about the characteristics and cultural backgrounds of ex-terrorist convicts. Meanwhile, the intelligence unit functions to seek additional information regarding ex-terrorist convicts.

The handling of radicalism in the Poso District through the “*Polisi Madago Raya*” program requires the appropriate communication strategy as the targets have different backgrounds. They carry out acts of terrorism not purely due to ideological factors but are triggered by vengeance on the Poso conflict in the past. This study aims to investigate acts of radicalism in the Poso district related to radicalism or terrorists in terrorist groups which are still being pursued by the police and to find the communication of the National Police in suppressing acts of radicalism in this district.

The communication approach performed by the police through police security and public order officers (*Bhayangkara Pembina keamanan dan ketertiban Masyarakat*, Bhabinkhamtibmas) is aimed at terrorist convicts, ex-terrorist convicts, and their families. Discussions about radicalism and public awareness of the dangers of radicalism have to be a serious and continuous agenda as radicalism has now become a serious and real issue in Indonesia (Fanani, 2013; Thoyyib, 2018 Umar, 2010).

### **Material and Methodology**

This study used a qualitative method. A qualitative study is important and effective in exploring problems with subjectivity according to participants' experiences based on individual and group experiences, direct observation, and others, which produces findings without using statistical calculations (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Hamilton & Finley, 2020; Lefèvre et al., 2019). Several factors influenced the success of the deradicalization program, including aspects of apparatus communication, clarity of program operational standards, good coordination of authority and

availability of resources (Fauzi & Muhammad, 2023; Pattiwaellapia et al., 2023; Masyhar & Munib, 2022).

However, several parties also considered that the deradicalization program had not been implemented effectively. In implementing the deradicalization program, National Counter Terrorism Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* or BNPT) refers to the 2013 Deradicalization Blueprint (Kominfo, 2019). Although, the results of Sugiarto's study indicate that BNPT does not have a written and detailed communication planning strategy (Sugiarto, 2020). In fact, based on the main ideas of communication planning, the communication planning strategy requires it to be made in a written document. Among them are a combination of the communication planning models of Assifi and French, ACADA, Diffusion of Innovation Everret M. Rogers, John Middleton, and Philip Lesly. The communication planning strategy model for the deradicalization program

However, from the results of in-depth interviews referring to the communication planning model, BNPT has actually implemented a communication planning strategy in the deradicalization program. Based on the author's analysis, BNPT uses a combination of communication planning models in the deradicalization program.

The population of this study was terrorist convicts, ex-terrorist convicts, families of terrorists and ex-terrorists, and all parties involved in handling radicalism in the Poso District. The sample was determined using the purposive sampling technique. Consideration should be given to research subjects who are more likely to receive the researcher's presence than others: (1) their ability and willingness to express past and present experiences; (2) anyone who is considered interesting, for example having special experiences; and (3) it would be wiser to avoid selecting subjects who have professional and other special relationships, who already have special assumptions or preconceptions that color their interpretation of what is expressed.

This technique considers the participants that have a lot of information about the problem under study and is most effective in non-probability sampling as the consideration is based on the research objectives (Campbell et al., 2020; Nyimbili & Nyimbili, 2024; Thomas, 2022). Most studies need to determine the sample size at the beginning of the study as the sample size in qualitative research should be based on theoretical and practical considerations and be relevantly determined (Mthuli et al., 2022; Robinson, 2014; Sivasamy, 2023). This present study involved 21 respondents who know more about radicalization and terrorism in Poso District (see Table 1). In this study, 21 informants were selected because they were the implementers and targets of the deradicalization program, and each deradicalization implementer had a different approach.

The data were collected by in-depth interviews, direct observation is the context observed in this study is the implementation process of the deradicalization program, how Bhabinkamtibmas or the local public and safety officers) approaches former terrorist convicts with various activities carried out. and literature and document studies. In qualitative research, data analysis is carried out throughout the research. This is done through descriptions of research data, reviewing existing themes, and highlighting certain themes (Bingham, 2023; Saldana, 2014).

The design of data analysis in this study begins by reviewing all available data from various sources, both interviews and document recordings. Data analysis in this study begins by carrying out the data reduction process. The data reduction process carried out by the author is by conducting a complete review of the data collected from the field regarding Police Communication with Former Terrorist Convicts in the "*Polisi Madago Raya*" Program in Poso Regency, then sorting it into certain categories.

The next step is for the author to make a descriptive and systematic summary so that the central theme, namely Police Communication with Former Terrorist Convicts in the "*Polisi Madago Raya*" Program in Poso Regency, can be easily identified. Furthermore, the author draws conclusions based on data obtained from various sources and is temporary while looking for other supporting data. At this stage, the author conducts a study of the conclusions to be drawn with comparative data from a particular theory. The author does this in order to see the truth of the analysis results that will produce reliable conclusions.

**Table 1.** Respondent Profile

No.	Samples and Initials	Status	Occupation	Education
1	Kombes. Pol Hondawan Nahibao	Dir Binmas (police' community development unit) of Sulteng Regional Police	Police	S2
2	Kombes. Bogiek Sugiarto, S.H., SIK., M.H.	Chief of Poso Police Precinct	Police	S2
3	Kolonel Mar. (Purn) Darmin Agustinus Sigilipu	Poso Regent	Local government worker	S1
4	Ust Adnan Aarsal	Religious figure	Pension	S1
5	Kompol. Robi Utomo. SH.MH	Chief of Poso Police Sub-precinct	Police	S2
6	Iptu Mansyur. Masloman	Head of Community Development Unit of Poso Police Precinct	Police	SHS
7	Iptu.Andi Cakra	Head of Community Development Unit of Poso Pesisir Police Sub-precinct	Police	S1
8	Bripka Andi Rum	Bhabinkamtibmas Bonesompe	Police	SHS
9	Bripka Sutriansyah	Bhabinkamtibmas Towu	Police	VHS
10	Bripka. Ahmad Fuad	Bhabinkamtibmas Tegal Rejo	Police	SHS
11	AL	Ex-terrorist convict	Private	SHS
12	MYD	Ex-terrorist convict	Private	SHS
13	HRS	Ex-terrorist convict	Private	SHS
14	AS	Ex-terrorist convict	Farmer	SHS
15	SWS	Ex-terrorist convict's wife	Housewife	Elementary School
16	IW	Ex-terrorist convict	Private	SHS
17	Diah Fitria Kartikasari. S.I.Kom., M.I.Kom.	Youth figure	Lecturer	S2
18	Ari Fahri, S.Sos., M.I.Kom.	Youth figure	Lecturer	S2
19	Drs. H. Wawa Suryatna, M.Hi.	Ministry of Religious Affairs	Civil servant	S1
20	Prof. Dr. Ilyas Lampe, M.Si.	Academic / secretary of the conflict agency of Tadulako University	Lecturer	S3
21	Drs. Muhammad Marzuki, M.Si.	Academic / Member of Central Sulawesi Counter Terrorism Coordination Forum	Lecturer	Doctor candidate

Source: Elaborated research data.

## Result and Discussion

The results of this study cover the distribution of counter-terrorism in Indonesia, the description of the Poso conflict, radicalism, and terrorism in the Poso District, and the results of respondent interviews.

*Distribution of Counterterrorism in Indonesia.* Counterterrorism measures from January 2017 to November 2019 still focused on Java Island. This Java-centric measure was suspected of causing the spread of terror groups to other areas. Then, the terror groups began to thrive outside Java, for example, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) in North Sumatra (Hutagalung, 2019) and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Poso District.

*Poso Conflict.* Poso is one of the districts in Indonesia that is known for communal conflicts and is prone to acts of terrorism. In this district, the communal conflict which occurred in 1998-2000 killed hundreds of people, displaced thousands of people, and caused great material losses. The conflict is divided into some phases. The first phase occurred in December 1998, then it continued in April 2000 with the biggest conflict from May to June 2000. The conflict was resolved by the issue of the Malino agreement in December 2001, which reconciled the parties involved, Muslim and Christian groups (Tressa, 2020).

The policy of restoring security in Poso is indeed almost as long as the Poso conflict. Initially, the first conflict in December 1998 still used the sociocultural approach as a resolution. But, the conflict cannot be resolved and even became wider and fiercer. In the second conflict in April 2000, the Regional Police of Central Sulawesi Province began to carry out the security operation of Sadar Maleo. It was carried out for up to 5 (five) stages, starting from July 1, 2000. Then, it was followed by the Sintuwu Maroso operation in 2001-2005, the Lanto Dago operation in 2006-2008, and the Camar Maleo operation 1 and 2 in 2012-2013. Besides, to maintain stability in this district after the communal conflict, the Infantry Battalion 714/Sintuwu Maroso (Yonif 714/SM) was established in 2005 (Tressa, 2020).

The operation was continued from 2015 to 2017 under the code of Tinombala to track down the radical terrorist group Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) which was indicated to have an association with the ISIS terrorism network in the Middle East. This group emerged after the communal conflict occurred. This group has built a base in the Poso mountain area and carried out various attacks on both civilians and security forces (Tressa, 2020). Moreover, from 2018 to date, the Regional Police of Central Sulawesi Province through the Poso Police Precinct has carried out the "*Polisi Madago Raya*" program as one of the approaches to counter radicalism in Poso District. Based on the BNPT data in 2018, the terror networks of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansarud Daulah (JAD), Jamaah Anshorut Syariah (JAS), East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) are still active in Indonesia.

*Radicalism and Terrorism in Poso District.* The current radicalism in Poso District has led to acts of terrorism. It can be seen from the rise of acts of radicalism which are considered an act of terrorism. It was initiated by the Poso conflict which led to a prolonged feud. There have been some acts of radicalism and terrorism causing injuries and even death since the Poso conflict occurred (see Table 2).

**Table 2.** Radicalism and Terrorism in Poso District

No.	Month	Year	Acts of Radicalism and Terrorism	Death	Injuries
1.	May	2005	Bomb at Tentena market, Poso	22	40
2.	July	2013	Bomb in front of Poso Police Headquarters, Central Sulawesi	1	0
3.	September	2016	Shootout between Police and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Tombua Plantation, Tangkura Village, Poso Pesisir Selatan District	1	0
4.	November	2016	Shootout between Police and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Sa Lubanga Village, Sausu, Parigi, Central Sulawesi	1	0
5.	December	2016	Leader of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) Qa Killed in a Shootout with the	2	0

			Tinombala Task Force in the Tambarana Mountains, Poso		
6.	January	2019	Mujahidin Indonesia Timur Terrorists (MIT) Mutilate Farmers in Sa Lubanga Village, Sausu, Parigi Moutong Regency	1	2
7.	March	2019	A shootout between police and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur Terrorists (MIT), in Marete Village, Sausu District, Parigi Moutong District	3	0
8.	April	2020	Members of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) attacked Police, Poso	2	1
9.	June	2020	Shoot of Residents in Poso Pesisir Utara	2	0
10.	August	2020	Murder of a retired TNI officer in Maholo Village, East Lore District, Poso District	1	0
11.	November	2020	Tinombala Task Force Shoot Fugitives at MIT Poso	2	0
12.	March	2021	Shootout between the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and TNI/Polri Task Force, Poso	3	0
13.	May	2021	Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Poso kill Farmers, Poso	4	0
14.	July	2021	A shootout between Police and Terrorists in Torue Parigi District, Central Sulawesi	3	0

Source: Liputan6.com (2021).

Table 2 shows that acts of radicalism and terrorism in the Poso District often occurred after a prolonged conflict. Therefore, the situation and conditions in this district are less conducive because there are many members of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) who have not been caught.

“*Polisi Madago Raya*” Program, comes from the Pamona (Poso) language which means good-hearted police. The program focuses on 3 aspects of deradicalization (strengthening the role of local police personnel in deradicalization activities; mapping areas of radicalism; building synergy in handling radicalism with stakeholders; and optimizing the role of religious leaders, community leaders and traditional leaders); counter deradicalization (determining the classification of *kelurahan*, village, or hamlet with characteristics of the threat of radicalism; listing the number of victims of radicalism; and carrying out police operations); rehabilitation (treatment of ex-terrorist convicts, families of terrorist convicts, families of the wanted list (DPO, *daftar pencarian orang*) who died as a result of police law enforcement).

The formal legality of the implementation of the “*Polisi Madago Raya*” program as a deradicalization effort by Bhabinkamtibmas based on the Commander Wish of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri) point 4 (increasing security stability), the mission of the Chief of the National Police point 7 (increasing *harkamtibmas* or public order and safety by involving the public through police synergy), and the Chief of National Police Program point 3 (more optimal handling of pro-violent and intolerance radical groups with early detection and action detection in the context of mapping pro-violence and intolerance radical groups) and 8 (building awareness and socialization of public order and security by building prevention of terrorism, drugs, separatism, and Pancasila ideology), as well the Quick Wins point 2 of the Chief of the National Police (tracking and arresting the terrorist leader (Santoso) and terrorism networks).

*Results of Interviews.* The following table presents the results of interviews with 21 respondents including terrorist convicts, ex-terrorist convicts, families of terrorists and ex-terrorists, and all parties involved in handling radicalism in the Poso District.

**Table 3.** Conclusion of the Results of the Interviews

No.	Questions	Results of Interview	Respondent
1.	How do the police determine ex-terrorists as targets of the	The criteria are people who have joined terrorist groups and been accused of under the Terrorism Law. The Poso Police Precinct has data on terrorist convicts and ex-terrorist	Poso Police Precinct (8 respondents)

	deradicalization program?	convicts. However, the focus of the deradicalization of Bhabinkamtibmas is ex-terrorist convicts and families of terrorist convicts as well as the sympathizers.	
2.	Can you explain the communication pattern used by the National Police to carry out the deradicalization program in dealing with terrorism cases in the Poso district?	Concerning the door-to-door system initiated by Bhabinkamtibmas, we visited even though we did not have a certain issue and happened to have nothing to do. We visited the house where the ex-terrorist group often gathered. Their house is located in our coverage area. We often stopped by just to say hello or have a short conversation before and after going to the office. Sometimes, if we had more time, we discussed many things and I think it can be good for building a good relationship so that there is not much distance between the police and ex-terrorists. They became more open with the police. They did not only help the police by not getting involved in radical groups but also provided information for us when our target had problems.	Poso Police Precinct (8 respondent)
3.	Do the National Police get tasks concerning deradicalization before interacting with ex-terrorist convicts and their families as well as sympathizers?	Yes, there is. Before we visited the ex-terrorists, we designed the message that will be conveyed. The point of the message was varied, straightforward, flexible, and not pressuring or dictating.	Poso Police Precinct (8 respondents)
4.	What messages are conveyed by members of the police in the deradicalization process?	The message is encouraging them to maintain order and security in our coverage area in particular and the Poso district in general and to help us in implementing the deradicalization program.	Poso Police Precinct (8 respondents)
5.	What are the media used by the Police in the deradicalization process?	The social media used by the Binmas directorate to socialize the deradicalization program and provide an appeal to avoid radicalism and acts of terrorism are FB, IG, and Twitter as instructed by the Chief of the National Police. Even, now we have Binmas Cyber which will be applied soon.	Poso Police Precinct (8 respondents)
6.	Regarding the placement of Bhabinkamtibmas in each area in the Poso District, are there certain criteria, especially for the area of ex-terrorist convicts, their families, and sympathizers?	Based on the mapping of regional potential, 1 village has 2 to 3 Bhabinkamtibmas, for example in the Tamanjeka area. This area is dominated by ex-terrorist convicts and sympathizers who are from Bugis tribes. Therefore, the selected Bhabinkamtibmas for this village are also from the "Bugis" tribe who are still young, energetic, religious, and have a good spirit of service.	Chief of Poso Police Precinct
7.	How is the deradicalization carried out by the Poso Police Precinct so far?	The deradicalization program carried out by the police is very good if it is in accordance with the target. However, the most important thing is the impact of the deradicalization program. After 2.5 years of the Regent's reign, the relationship between the Muslims and Christians is doing well. The local government hopes that the program will be sustainable. The local government always coordinates with the police concerning the required assistance to support the deradicalization program, such as guiding the ex-terrorist convicts who want to work as farmers, fishermen, raising cattle, and others. Besides, the police approached the wife of the terrorist convict and ex-terrorist convict.	Stakeholder (5 respondents)
8.	Are there any good results or no progress?	The local government works with the police, and the " <i>Polisi Madago Raya</i> " program is very soothing for the Poso community, especially ex-terrorist convicts, their families, and sympathizers. This becomes a challenge for the police and their staff to be able to apply for the program well. The	Local government (Poso regent)

		visible results of the program can be seen at the Bhayangkara birthday ceremony in which some ex-terrorist convicts present as guests which indicates a good result.	
9.	Why did you enter into a radical group and commit acts of terrorism?	We have joined a radical group since the resolution of the Poso conflict in which there were many victims from the same religious followers, including our family due to the massacres done by the red group (Christians). Due to this incident, a prolonged grudge arose but at that time we could not do anything. Then, the Mujahidin group entered Poso and recruited us to join the group by telling us about jihad. This group facilitated us to fight for revenge in the way of Allah. We were touched as at that time our religious knowledge was very limited so whatever they said, we accepted them all without analyzing whether they were under Islamic law or not. Besides, the Christian group that carried out the massacre was not investigated thoroughly. But, if it was done by the Muslims, it would be investigated very thoroughly. This injustice became one of the reasons for us to commit acts of violence.	Ex-terrorist convict (6 respondents)
10.	When you were released from detention, did the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), Densus 88, Poso Police visit?	The BNPT and Densus make visits every 3 months, but the Poso Police Precinct or the Bhabinkamtibmas, often visit us and even the chief of the police also visits our house.	Ex-terrorist convict (6 respondents)
11.	What messages did <i>bhabinkamtibmas</i> convey during the visit?	The message is very simple but has a broad meaning, for example, in the middle of our conversations about various things, Bhabinkamtibmas always inserts messages about helping the police to maintain order and security in Poso to avoid radical groups who can damage security. Therefore, we are invited to participate in everything to protect this region.	Ex-terrorist convict (6 respondents)

Source: Elaborated Interview Results.

Indonesia is facing a domestic security crisis characterized by the emergence of radical movements (Aminah, 2016). There have been more and more acts of radicalism in the name of religion in the last one and a half decades in this country. The phenomenon of radicalism in this country is in alarming condition (Atsani & Nasri, 2021; Imanulyaqin, 2021; Sulfikar, 2019; Tressa, 2020; Wardah, 2019), especially the violence in the name of religion which is known as religious radicalism (Ahmad et al., 2021; Mashuri et al., 2022; Sholikin, 2018). This makes all parties responsible for suppressing the spread of radicalism. The role of religious experts is highly needed to help the government stop terrorism (Erdianto, 2017; Ghosh, 2018; Nafi'a et al., 2022). Some government agencies that deal with radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia are the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the National Police (Polri), the Indonesian Military (TNI), and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN).

This study focuses on the National Police (Polri) in dealing with radicalism in Poso District, Central Sulawesi. The National Police has the task of maintaining public security and order, enforcing the law, and providing protection and services to the community. These tasks can be carried out to suppress the development of radicalism, especially in conflict areas with religious backgrounds such as Poso. The main cause of the issue in the Poso case is revenge (Erdianto, 2017). Radicalism and deradicalization are two political terms that appear in the recent handling of terrorism (Zuhri, 2018).

To present, the Poso conflict has given rise to radical ideas. Violence often occurs with religious backgrounds and even causes the death of terrorists, police, or the public. The National Police through the Poso Police Precinct is running a program aimed at suppressing the development of radicalism. The program is known as the "*Polisi Madago Raya*". This program involved "Bhabinkamtibmas" as the front guard of the National Police in the community, especially in the Poso District.



Concerning the issue, the targets of the “*Polisi Madago Raya*” program are ex-terrorist convicts, their families, and the sympathizers. The results of this study showed that the program has been run by “Bhabinkamtibmas” with a persuasive and humanist approach. These approaches are considered successful in resuscitating some ex-terrorist convicts in Poso District. Furthermore, the ex-terrorist convicts provide information to “Bhabinkamtibmas”. Handling terrorism should be done with a humanist approach (Kominfo, 2019). The results of a previous study conducted in 2020 showed that the potential for radicalism has decreased (Loedji, 2020).

Based on the results of the study, the radicalism in Poso District was caused by injustice and misunderstandings about religion. This condition has made radicalism grow through several terrors and murders done by Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) terrorists. Various acts of terror in Indonesia tend to be carried out by perpetrators who have a radical understanding of religion and are adjusted to the predetermined goals set by the reference group.

The radicalism that can lead to acts of terrorism is caused by many things, such as dissatisfaction, feeling marginalized, alienated, and hopelessness (Sadarussalam & Hasan, 2019). The results of the study showed that unfair treatment has made terrorists grow rapidly in the Poso district. It started with violence that led to acts of terrorism after the entry of radical ideas. Further, it was reinforced by revenge for the terrorist families who became the victims of the massacre so that it is easier for the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) group to recruit them to perform radicalism that leads to acts of terrorism.

The rise of acts of terrorism has created a stigma for Muslims (Hasanah, 2021). This condition makes Islam in the Poso District feel marginalized as all acts of violence or radicalism are associated with Islam. Therefore, the chief of the Poso Police Precinct has initiated the “*Polisi Madago Raya*” program to suppress the development of radicalism. The program serves as a communication platform for the National Police to communicate to the public that the police are present in suppressing violations. The results of this study showed that the National Police has many communication strategies in carrying out the “*Polisi Madago Raya*” program through “Bhabinkamtibmas”.

The social media used to socialize the deradicalization program and appeal for avoiding radicalism and acts of terrorism covered Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter as instructed by the head of the National Police. The use of social media aims to minimize acts of radicalism and maintain national security. Radicalism and terrorism have caused a national security crisis (Aminah, 2016). However, a study revealed that the act of radicalism in Indonesia is higher than 10 percent (Khafifah et al., 2019). The index of potential for radicalism in Indonesia in 2020 decreased to 14.0% (on a scale of 0-100) or decreased by 12.2% compared to 2019 which reached 38.4% (Loedji, 2020; Susilo, 2020).

The rise of radicalism practices that lead to terrorism originated from intolerant thoughts and actions that affect a small number of community groups in Indonesia (Subagyo, 2020). In Poso District, radicalism was caused by revenge, injustice, and intolerance. This study found that revenge and injustice became the main causes of community involvement in acts of terrorism. Therefore, it is necessary for the government, in this case, the police, to massively communicate deradicalization programs to the public to avoid the spread of radicalism. Appeals can influence the terrorist’s thoughts to think positively to avoid causing harm to themselves and to avoid endless revenge. The police have utilized social media for communication. Further, this study found that radicalism was also generated from endless revenge.

The results of this study have implications for the National Police in handling acts of radicalism that led to terrorism. Besides, the public can also understand that in conflicts with a religious background, all parties must provide a massive understanding of the conflict or not to cause prolonged resentment as occurred in Poso. It is also necessary to anticipate radical ideas in society to protect the public from potential exposure to radicalism. Moreover, the police must anticipate the emerging radical ideas that will cause the conflict bigger and lead to radicalism.

## Conclusions

Any conflict with a religious background can provoke radicalism and it has the potential to expose radical ideas to conflicting communities. Therefore, police need to perform massive communication to suppress the spread of radicalism. The results of this study indicated that the communication of the National Police through the Bhabinkamtibmas with the “*Polisi Madago Raya*”

program is still ongoing and considered successful in suppressing the spread of radicalism in Poso District. The results of this study reveal that the acts of radicalism in Poso were caused by revenge and injustice so it is easier for the people to be recruited by the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) group to carry out acts of radicalism that led to terrorism.

The National Police through the Poso Police Precinct has applied various approaches to suppress radicalism by using some communication strategies. One of them is the use of social media to socialize the dangers and risks of understanding radicalism. The use of social media such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter is helpful for the police to communicate. Social media are used as a police communication tool to suppress the growth and development of radicalism throughout Indonesia, including in the Poso District.

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